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THE OPIOID CRISIS: THE STATES’ AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ 
RESPONSE TO BIGPHARMA’S DECEPTION AND WHY THE 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE MAY PROVIDE A CLOAK FOR OPIOID 
MANUFACTURERS TO HIDE BEHIND 
Tracie Childers* 
Drug addiction has long been recognized in the medical community as a disa-
bility.1 Two of our nation’s largest benefit providers for individuals with disabilities, 
Social Security Disability (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), treated 
addiction as a disability and provided income, treatment, and medical care to indi-
viduals with an addiction disorder from the mid-1970s until the 1990s.2 Then, as part 
of the 1996 welfare reform package, individuals whose only disorder was addiction 
were disqualified from receiving benefits.3 
On the heels of this change the opioid crisis took form. The Food and Drug Ad-
ministration’s (FDA) acting commissioner, Dr. Stephen M. Ostroff, addressed the 
current crisis during the Food and Drug Law Institute (FDLI) Annual Conference 
in Washington, D.C. on May 4, 2017. Dr. Ostroff began by recognizing the opioid 
epidemic as a monumental health crisis and one of the greatest modern tragedies of 
our time.4 Dr. Ostroff then pledged that the FDA would not be part of the opioid 
problem, but instead would ensure an “ironclad” commitment to finding a solution 
to the opioid epidemic.5 These words are difficult to digest when the FDA regulates 
and approves the opioids for use and distribution in the United States, especially 
when benefits for addiction disability treatment are nearly non-existent.6  
This article will begin by providing an introduction into the depths of opioid 
addiction disability in America today: statistical information as to what constitutes 
 _________________________  
 * Barry University, Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, J.D. 2018; University of Central Florida, B.A. 
Criminal Justice, Certification in Victim’s Advocacy. 
1 Max Slever, Disability Benefits and Addiction; Resolving an Uncertain Burden, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 954, 954 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 955–56.  
 3. Id. at 957. See also THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 
1996, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (Sept. 1, 1996), https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/personal-responsibility-
and-work-opportunity-reconciliation-act-1996 (describing the 1996 welfare plan as a bipartisan reform plan, signed 
into law by then-President Bill Clinton on August10, 1996, that mandates work requirements in exchange for time 
limited assistance and provides state bonuses for moving welfare recipients off of assistance and into the workforce); 
H.R. 3136, 104th Cong. (1996) (Section 105 of Public Law 104–121, enacted as part of the “Right to Work Act” of 
1996, which states in part, “An individual shall not be considered to be disabled for purposes of this title if alcoholism 
or drug addiction would ‘but for this subparagraph’ be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s deter-
mination that the individual is disabled”). 
 4. Stephen M. Ostroff, Article, Remarks by Acting FDA Commissioner Stephen M. Offstroff, MD FDLI 
Annual Conference May 4, 2017 Washington D.C.:FDA: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 72 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 
378, 382 (2017). 
 5. Id.  
 6. See Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Pain Management and the Opioid Epidemic: 
Balancing Societal and Individual Benefits and Risks of Prescription Opioid Use 359 (2017); supra note 3 and ac-
companying text. 
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an addiction disability crisis; the organizations being blamed for the widespread ep-
idemic; and the government’s response (i.e., the ensuing litigations) to the issue.  
Next, a background will be laid out that will timestamp the evolution of opioid 
distribution and use, the backlash of proliferation of opioids, and the initiation of the 
legal disputes against BigPharma to recover losses incurred by government entities 
battling the ongoing opioid epidemic. 
Third, this article will provide an overview of the federal government’s role in 
approving and regulating opioids, a Schedule II narcotic, for use in the United States. 
It is imperative to understand the FDA’s actions and inactions in promoting and de-
terring opioid use when determining accountability for the epidemic. Is the FDA’s 
approval and regulation of opioids enough to trump state and local legal claims?  
Fourth, an analysis of the legal claims will be discussed as well as a comparative 
examination of the current lawsuits against opioid manufacturers and the lawsuits 
against tobacco manufacturers during the 1990s. One distinct difference between the 
two legal battles involves the FDA’s role in regulating the two products. Tobacco 
was not FDA regulated until 2009, and as such, tobacco was not federally regulated 
during the onset of the lawsuits against tobacco manufacturers.7  
Last, this article will set forth remedial measures to consider, for example, leg-
islative and policy changes on the treatment of addiction disability and funding in-
centives that may assist in alleviating future epidemics. Regulatory changes should 
be considered to prevent potentially harmful drugs from further making their way 
into mainstream society. Additionally, this article will set forth an overview of where 
potential legal funds would be most effective in the treatment of addiction disability.    
I.    INTRODUCTION 
More than 115 individuals are dying each day in the United States alone as a 
result of an opioid overdose.8 What is now known is that 21%–29% of patients pre-
scribed opioids will misuse them; the misuse yields another 8%–12% that will de-
velop an addiction; and another 4%–6% that will transition to heroin.9 Approxi-
mately 80% of all heroin users are linked to first abusing opioids.10 Statistics also 
show a nationwide increase of 30%, from July 2016 through September 2017 for 
overdose treatment by emergency departments.11 In 2016 a reported 11.5 million 
Americans, ages 12 and older, abused opioids and roughly 950,000 individuals used 
heroin.12 According to the President of the United States Donald J. Trump,  “drug 
 _________________________  
 7. The Facts on the FDA’s New Tobacco Rule, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., www.fda.gov/ForConsum-
ers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm506676.htm (last updated Nov. 9, 2017); see also German Lopez, The Growing Number 
of Lawsuits Against Opioid Companies Explained, Vox, (last updated May 15, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2017/6/7/15724054/opioid-epidemic-lawsuits-purdue-oxycontin. 
 8. Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opi-
oids/opioid-overdose-crisis (last visited Mar. 2018). 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Opioid Overdoses Treated in Emergency Departments, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/opioid-overdoses/ (last updated Mar. 16, 2018). 
 12. See Press Release, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP IS TAKING ACTION 
ON DRUG ADDICTION AND THE OPIOID CRISIS (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-state-
ments/president-donald-j-trump-taking-action-drug-addiction-opioid-crisis.  
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overdoses are now the leading cause of injury death in the United States, outnum-
bering both traffic crashes and gun related deaths”.13 All of this computes to an esti-
mated expense of “$78.5 billion a year, including the costs of healthcare, lost produc-
tivity, addiction treatment, and criminal justice involvement.”14 A nationwide public 
health emergency has been declared by President Donald J. Trump to address what 
is now coined the “opioid crisis.”15   
Who is to blame for the increase of individuals with addiction to opioids? Ac-
cording to hundreds of government entities throughout the United States, the blame 
falls on the manufacturers of opioids, their key opinion leaders (KOLs), distributers 
of the product, and the physicians prescribing the drugs;16 a claim that the Big-
Pharma17 industry adamantly denies.18 While the answer to this question remains 
uncertain, some facts are conclusive: addiction disability is growing among Ameri-
cans; state and local agencies are footing an astronomical amount of money combat-
ing addiction-related issues; and government officials are preparing to fight to re-
cover losses incurred.19 Over 300 entities including states, counties, and cities have 
filed lawsuits against opioid manufacturers, and the number is continuing to grow.20 
Many outlets are comparing the current opioid lawsuits to the tobacco lawsuits of 
the 1990s, which awarded government entities billions of dollars in damages.21 Much 
like the preceding tobacco lawsuits, the recent legal allegations against BigPharma 
include deceptive trade practices and product misrepresentation.22  The question is 
 _________________________  
 13. Id.  
 14. Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, supra note 8. 
 15. Press Release, White House, supra note 12.  
 16. See KAISER HEALTH NEWS, More than 320 Counties, Cities and States are Suing Drug Makers for Role 
in Opioid Epidemic, KHN MORNING BRIEFING (Feb. 14, 2018), https://khn.org/morning-breakout/more-than-320-
counties-cities-and-states-are-suing-drugmakers-for-role-in-opioid-epidemic/. See also City of Chicago v. Purdue 
Pharma L.P., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Complaint at 3–4, Florida v. Purdue Pharma L.P., et. al., 
No. 2018-CA-001438 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed May 15, 2018); Nadia Kounang, 41 State Attorneys General Subpoena 
Opioid Manufacturers, CNN (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/19/health/state-ag-investigation-opi-
oids-subpoenas/index.html; Katie Benner & Jan Hoffman, Justice Dept. Backs High-Stakes Lawsuit Against Opioid 
Makers, N.Y. TIMES,(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/us/politics/justice-department-opioid-
lawsuit.html; Csaba Sukosd, City of Columbus Sues 25 Drug Companies, Claiming Damages for Opioid Epidemic, 
ABC 6 NEWS, (Dec. 15, 2017), https://abc6onyourside.com/news/local/city-of-columbus-sues-25-drug-companies-
claiming-damages-for-opioid-epidemic; John C. Moritz, 6 States Sue Maker of OxyContin as they Battle Expenses, 
Human Costs of Opioid Crisis, USA TODAY, (May 15, 2018 | Updated 8:37 AM ET May 16, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/05/15/six-attorney-generals-opioid-lawsuits/612721002/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/78RS-9MQJ. 
 17. “Big Pharma,” Cambridge Dictionary Online, 2018, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/eng-
lish/big-pharma (Dec. 29, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/LVT3-UYPA.  
 18. See Sukosd, City of Columbus Sues 25 Drug Companies, Claiming Damages for Opioid Epidemic, supra 
note 16, see also Lopez, supra note 7. 
 19. See, e.g., Katie Zezima, Scope of Opioid Battle Headed to Ohio Court Compared to ‘90s Tobacco Indus-
try Settlements, Chi. Trib., Apr. 7, 2018, , http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-opioid-battle-ohio-
20180407-story.html; see Moritz, supra note 16.  
 20. See KAISER HEALTH NEWS, supra note 16.  
 21. See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 7; Katie Zezima, supra note 19; Bill Meagher, America’s Opioid Crisis 
Looks a Lot Like Big Tobacco Spats of Yesteryear, THE STREET (last visited, Jan. 7, 2018, 7:18 AM), 
https://www.thestreet.com/story/14397159/1/how-opioid-crisis-of-today-resembles-big-tobacco-lawsuits-battles; 
James E. Tierney, It’s Time to Take on Big Opioid Like We Did with Big Tobacco, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & 
POL’Y (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/its-time-to-take-on-big-opioid-like-we-did-with-big-to-
bacco. 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1105–06 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The United 
States alleged that Defendants fraudulently misrepresented their products and used deceptive trade practices by cov-
ering up the negative health effects of smoking, underplaying the addictiveness of nicotine, and marketing to specific 
individuals and classes of people, e.g., children, that would be most likely to use tobacco. 
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whether key players involved in the manufacturing, distributing, and prescribing of 
opioids used deceptive tactics to promote the product when opioids are FDA regu-
lated, unlike the tobacco industry during the 1990s.23  
II.    BACKGROUND 
A. The Introduction of OxyContin in the United States 
In 1996, OxyContin, an opioid pain medication with a high addiction and de-
pendency risk, was introduced into the United States by Purdue Pharma and aggres-
sively campaigned and marketed as a non-addictive medication to treat acute pain.24 
Purdue’s aggressive marketing of OxyContin reached figures of approximately $200 
million a year.25 Within a four-year span, the sales of OxyContin increased from $48 
million to nearly $1.1 billion.26 In 2001, OxyContin was the most prescribed opioid 
medication for moderate to severe pain.27 By 2004, OxyContin was documented as 
the most abused drug in the United States.28 The marketing tactics employed by Pur-
due Pharma were, among other things, carefully calculated.29 Unfortunately, the bil-
lions of dollars that Purdue Pharma profited from the sale of OxyContin left behind 
a trail of millions of individuals with addiction disorders.30  
Proliferation of OxyContin in the United States led to the pills getting into the 
hands of not only the individuals prescribed the drug but also others.31 To put this 
into perspective, pharmacists filled 245 million opioid prescriptions in 2010 alone, 
with OxyContin accounting for the vast majority.32 This led to millions of these 
 _________________________  
 23. See National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, supra note 64, at 359; Lopez, su-
pra note 7. See also THE FACTS ON THE FDA’S NEW TOBACCO RULE, SUPRA NOTE 7.). 
 24. Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Trag-
edy, 99(2) AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 221, 221 (2009).  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. U.S. Gen. Accounting. Off., GAO-04-110, OXYCONTIN ABUSE AND DIVERSION AND EFFORTS TO 
ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 2 (2003). 
 28. Van Zee, supra note 24, at 224.  
 29. Id. at 222. (“From 1996 to 2001, Purdue conducted more than 40 national pain-management and speaker-
training conferences at resorts in Florida, Arizona, and California. More than 5000 physicians, pharmacists, and 
nurses attended these all-expenses-paid symposia, where they were recruited and trained for Purdue’s national 
speaker bureau. It is well documented that this type of pharmaceutical company symposium influences physicians’ 
prescribing, even though the physicians who attend such symposia believe that such enticements do not alter their 
prescribing patterns. One of the cornerstones of Purdue’s marketing plan was the use of sophisticated marketing data 
to influence physicians’ prescribing. . . . A lucrative bonus system encouraged sales representatives to increase sales 
of OxyContin in their territories, resulting in a large number of visits to physicians with high rates of opioid pre-
scriptions, as well as a multifaceted information campaign aimed at them. In 2001, in addition to the average sales 
representative’s annual salary of $55,000, annual bonuses averaged $71,500, with a range of $15,000 to nearly 
$240,000. Purdue paid $40 million in sales incentive bonuses to its sales representatives that year. . . . Purdue pro-
moted among primary care physicians a more liberal use of opioids, particularly sustained-release opioids. . . . Pri-
mary care physicians began to use more of the increasingly popular OxyContin; by 2003, nearly half of all physicians 
prescribing OxyContin were primary care physicians. Some experts were concerned that primary care physicians 
were not sufficiently trained in pain management or addiction issues.” Id. at 124) 
 30. See generally Patrick Radden Keefe, Empire of Pain, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-empire-of-pain. 
 31. Lopez, supra note 7.  
 32. Katherin Eban, OxyContin: Purdue Pharma’s Painful Medicine, FORTUNE (Nov. 9, 2011), http://for-
tune.com/2011/11/09/oxycontin-purdue-pharmas-painful-medicine/. 
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highly addictive pills flooding mainstream society. As the dependency rate contin-
ued to grow, the demand for the drug sent opioid-dependent individuals to the black 
market to feed their addictions.33 The cost for OxyContin in 2011 was estimated to 
be $50–$80 a pill on the black market.34 In addition to overprescribing by medical 
prescribers, another major contributing factor to the black market supply was “pill 
mills” operating as pain clinics. The term “pill mill” refers to a medical facility where 
medical providers prescribe Schedule II narcotic medications, often times for cash, 
to individuals without any medical need for the drugs.35 These facilities habitually 
do not keep medical records, frequently require no medical exams, and treat alleged 
symptoms with only drugs.36 Additionally, patients are in and out of their appoint-
ments in a matter of minutes, are able to choose what drugs they want prescribed, 
and are provided a return date at check out.37 Patients of these facilities can often be 
seen using the drugs they obtain from the clinic in plain sight of the facility, and 
there is frequently a line of patients waiting to enter.38 Southern states became a hub 
for “pill mills” and pain medication distribution.39  
For instance, Florida is the state known as the epicenter of the prescription pain 
medication epidemic.40 Florida lacked a system for monitoring the disbursement of 
pain medications, and as such, could not prevent the inevitable “doctor shopping” 
that was occurring.41 “Doctor shopping” is when individuals travel around from doc-
tor to doctor to avoid detection from being overprescribed powerful pain medica-
tions.42 “Doctor shopping” allowed individuals to purchase Schedule II narcotics as 
often as they wanted without the detection of being overprescribed the drug. Inter-
state 75 in Florida became known as the “Oxy Express” because of the abundance 
of “pill mills” located throughout the state in close proximity to the interstate exits.43 
The reality is that corrupt medical doctors have been acting as street-level drug deal-
ers for financial gain and have been doing so at the expense of the lives of the indi-
viduals with addiction disorders, as well as states, cities, and communities.44  
B. The Withdrawal – The Physical Cost of Opioid Use 
The physical withdrawal process off of opioids is extremely daunting and pain-
ful. Signs of withdrawal will begin six to twelve hours after the last dose was taken 
and will include tearing up, muscle aches, agitation, insomnia, excessive yawning, 
 _________________________  
 33. Id. 
 34. Sky High Prices for Prescription Opioids Sold on Street, PARTNERSHIP FOR DRUG-FREE KIDS (June 1, 
2011), https://drugfree.org/learn/drug-and-alcohol-news/sky-high-prices-for-prescription-opioids-sold-on-street/. 
 35. See The Ugly Truth About Pill Mills in the United States, NORTHPOINT RECOVERY (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.northpointrecovery.com/blog/ugly-truth-pill-mills-united-states/.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Greg Allen, The Oxy Express: Florida’s Drug Abuse Epidemic, NPR, (Mar. 2, 2011), 
https://www.npr.org/2011/03/02/134143813/the-oxy-express-floridas-drug-abuse-epidemic. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
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anxiety, runny nose, cold sweats, racing heart, hypertension, and fever.45 Long-term 
symptoms will be felt at approximately day three and can last up to two weeks there-
after.46 The long-term symptoms will include nausea and vomiting, diarrhea, goose 
bumps, stomach cramps, depression, and immense drug cravings.47 Any one of these 
symptoms would be difficult for someone to go through; so the idea of experiencing 
many of them, or all of them at once, for an extended period of time, would be seem-
ingly impossible to handle. The fear of the pain of withdrawal associated with opioid 
use contributes immensely to the repetitive nature of addiction.48  
The longer an individual takes an opioid the more tolerant their system will be-
come to the drug.49 This will lead to an opioid user needing higher and more frequent 
doses to prevent withdrawal and the inevitable ensuing pain.50 It is foreseeable that, 
in time, the physical need for the drug becomes an expense that many users can no 
longer afford.  
C. The Repercussions of Addiction Disability 
Individuals with an active addiction disorder will begin to turn to alternative 
methods to obtain the funds to maintain their comfort zone and avoid withdrawal.51 
Many of them will first commonly turn to their families and friends for financial 
support to obtain the drug.52 This typically manifests by an individual with an addic-
tion disorder repeatedly asking to borrow money, and then will eventually lead to 
lying and stealing from family and friends in determination of securing enough 
money to keep purchasing more of the drug.53 Very often family and friends will 
discontinue financial assistance to a loved one battling an addiction disorder in an 
effort to prevent enabling the disorder further.54 The backlash to families and friends 
of isolating an individual with addiction disorder is that the individual often times 
cannot find alternative, accessible, and appropriate help or are not in the right state 
of mind to want and accept help if it is available. This places the burden on the com-
munity at large. A correlation between widespread crime sprees and opiate use is 
 _________________________  
 45. See Opiate Withdrawal Timelines, Symptoms and Treatment, AM. ADDICTION CTR., https://ameri-
canaddictioncenters.org/withdrawal-timelines-treatments/opiate/ (last visited July 2018); Withdrawing from Opiates 
and Opioids, HEALTH LINE, https://www.healthline.com/health/opiate-withdrawal (last visited July 2018). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Opiate Withdrawal Timelines, Symptoms and Treatment, supra note 45. 
 49. See OxyContin Dependence–Signs of OxyContin Use Vs. Abuse, Tolerance, https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20171010233418/https://www.dependency.net/learn/oxycontin/ (last visited July 2018). 
 50. Id.  
 51. Lisa Frederiksen, Why Addicts / Alcoholics Lie, Cheat, Steal, BREAKING THE CYCLES BLOG (June 10, 
2013), http://www.breakingthecycles.com/blog/2013/06/10/why-alcoholics-lie-cheat-steal/; see also The Ugly 
Truth About Pill Mills in the United States, supra note 35. 
 52. See Marisa Crane, When a Friend or Family Member Is Stealing From You for Drugs, REHABS.COM, 
http://luxury.rehabs.com/drug-addiction/when-someone-is-stealing/ (last visited July 2018).  
 53. Id. 
 54. See 9 Tips for Family Members to Stop Enabling an Addict, THE RECOVERY VILLAGE, https://www.the-
recoveryvillage.com/family-friend-portal/stop-enabling-an-addict/#gref (last visited July 2018). 
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evident.55 The criminal justice system is encountering increased cases of theft, bur-
glary, and other crimes related to opioid drug use.56 It is not solely family, friends, 
and the criminal justice systems that are affected by fallout of opioid addiction; the 
medical community is seeing an increase of babies born addicted to opiates, opioid 
overdoses, hepatitis C infections, HIV, and other opioid-use-related issues.57  The 
commonality amongst the repercussions of opioid drug addiction is the burden and 
expense it places on the individuals with the disability, their family and friends as 
well as counties, cities, and states. 
D. Recovering the Losses of Addiction Disability 
In 2014, the City of Chicago, Illinois, made a bold move by filing a lawsuit in 
Illinois state court against Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of OxyContin, along 
with four other large manufacturers of other powerful and popular pain medica-
tions.58 On June 3, 2014, City of Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel announced that: 
For years, big pharma has deceived the public about the true risks 
and benefits of highly     potent and highly addictive painkillers in 
order to expand their customer base and increase their bottom line. 
This has led to a dramatic rise in drug addiction, overdose and di-
version in communities across the nation, and Chicago is not im-
mune to this epidemic. . .Today, we’re saying enough is enough – 
it’s time for these companies to end these irresponsible practices and 
be held accountable for their deceptive actions.59 
The lawsuit alleged misrepresentation of opioids by Purdue Pharma as well as 
the other named manufacturers.60 The City of Chicago’s goal is not to ban the drug 
completely, but instead, to end the deceptive marketing of the drug so that doctors 
and patients alike are able to make informed and educated decisions when it comes 
to prescribing and taking the powerful pain medications.61 Chicago’s complaint was 
initiated seven years after Purdue Pharma and three of its executives pled guilty to 
 _________________________  
 55. See generally Matthias Pierce et al, Insights into the Link Between Drug Use and Criminality: Lifetime 
Offending of Criminally-Active Opiate users, 179 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 309 (2017).   
 56. Drug and Crime Facts, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/duc.cfm (last visited 
June 8, 2018) ( “In 2002 about a quarter of convicted property and drug offenders in local jails had committed their 
crimes to get money for drugs. . . . Among state prisoners in 2004 the pattern was similar, with property (30%) and 
drug offenders (26%) more likely to commit their crimes for drug money than violent (10%) and public-order of-
fenders (7%). In federal prisons property offenders (11%) were less than half as likely as drug offenders (25%) to 
report drug money as a motive in their offenses.”). 
 57. See Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Increase in Hepatitis C Infections Linked 
to Worsening Opioid Crisis (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/2017/hepatitis-c-and-opioid-
injection-press-release.html; Elizabeth E. Krans et al., Caring for Opioid Dependent Pregnant Women: Prenatal 
and Postpartum Care Considerations, 58(2) CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 370 (2015). . 
 58. Press Release, Off. of the Mayor, City of Chicago Sues BigPharma for Deceptively Marketing Highly 
Addictive Prescription Painkillers (June 2014), https://www.cityofchicago.org/con-
tent/dam/city/depts./mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2014/June/06.03.14BigPharma.pdf. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
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misleading the public and were ordered to pay $634.5 million in fines,  serve proba-
tion, and complete community service.62 The news of Chicago’s lawsuit came at a 
time when the United States, as a nation, was fighting a seemingly losing war against 
the opioid crisis. It was a likely outcome that others would follow Chicago’s lead 
and initiate further lawsuits against Purdue Pharma and other manufacturers. From 
the time of the earlier lawsuits emerging in 2014 through present day, hundreds of 
government entities, inclusive of Attorneys General, have filed lawsuits against opi-
oid manufacturers, with Purdue Pharma a named staple among them.63 
III.     THE FDA’S INVOLVEMENT 
A. The Application Process  
The FDA is the federal organization responsible for investigating, approving, 
regulating, and classifying new drugs for use in the United States as well as the sub-
sequent promoting of the drugs.64 As such, the FDA has a critical role in the manu-
facturing and prescribing of OxyContin and other highly addictive opioids that are 
at the root of the current epidemic. The FDA’s involvement begins as early as the 
identification of cellular targets and possible candidate compounds, the stage in 
which new drugs are being tested on animals.65 Once compounds are found to be 
satisfactory in their preclinical trials, and warrant human testing, an Investigational 
New Drug Application is then filed with the FDA.66 The application goes into effect 
30 days after it has been reviewed by the FDA.67 It is at this point that the FDA 
oversight becomes more essential and human clinical studies begin; human clinical 
studies are broken down into three phases.68 Phase one typically uses just a few 
healthy human volunteers for clinical trials; phase two explores the results of the 
experimental drug on targets that have a specific condition of interest; and finally, 
phase three studies, which should take years to complete after enrolling hundreds to 
thousands of human subjects for testing the effects of the drugs on subjects with 
specific conditions over long periods of time.69 However, according to a review of 
the phase three studies by the Committee on Pain Management and Regulatory Strat-
egies—to address prescription opioid abuse—two-thirds of phase three studies actu-
ally last less than six months.70 During the clinical phases the manufacturer is the 
entity that remains responsible for organizing and controlling the clinical trials, but 
 _________________________  
 62. Sue Lindsey, Judge Fines OxyContin Maker and 3 Executives, THE WASH. POST (July 21, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/07/20/AR2007072001714.html?noredirect=on. 
 63. See Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 8.  
 64. NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE 
OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID Use 
361–65 (2017); see also 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2012) (for the application for an Investigational New Drug); WHAT DOES 
FDA REGULATE?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,  https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Ba-
sics/ucm194879.htm (last updated Mar. 28, 2018).   
 65. See NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, supra note 6, at 361.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 362. 
 68. See 7 U.S.C. § 2131. 
 69. NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, supra note 6, at 362. 
 70. Id.  
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it will, and very often does, consult with a team of FDA experts in the field of phar-
maceutical studies.71  
At the completion of the clinical trials, the manufacturer will then file a New 
Drug Application with the FDA.72 It is at this stage that a team of FDA experts in the 
field of pharmaceutical studies reviews the data to determine if the product is safe 
for consumer use in the United States.73 There is a 60 day New Drug Application 
filing period during which time the FDA ensures that all of the data required by the 
FDA has been furnished.74 The FDA, thereafter, will begin to review the data pro-
vided. The standard review period is ten months; however, if the drug appears to 
have therapeutic advances the ten month review period can be granted a six month 
priority review status.75  
The standard of review that the FDA conforms to when analyzing the data is a 
risk-benefit assessment.76 Leaving behind the traditional standard of review—a two 
prong test that incorporated safety and substantial evidence—the FDA now relies on 
whether the benefit of the approval for the particular interest sought will outweigh 
the risks associated with the drug’s use; this is referred to as evidence of efficacy.77  
During the review process the FDA can use review committees which are comprised 
of outside experts; ironically these committees are inclusive of one consumer repre-
sentative and one non-voting industry representative.78 This unquestionably creates 
a bias review of the drugs. A review of these advisory committees over a four-year 
span showed that the committees recommended approval of the new drugs 74% of 
the time, with the FDA granting the subsequent approval 79% of the time.79  
Despite counter measures the FDA enacts to ensure the public’s safety, there are 
many obvious holes in the laws and provisions in place. For example, if a medication 
is proven effective, does that make the medication “more effective” than one already 
in circulation, or less harmful during long term use? Another fallacy in pain medica-
tion testing is that it is  inclusive of only one type of pain (e.g. back pain) and not 
encompassing the entire population of end users that will be prescribed the medica-
tion for various degrees of pain due to significantly different reasons.80  Furthermore, 
nearly all opioid medications are a derivative (i.e. reformulation) of an already tested 
and approved formula, and as such, the application process relies on published data 
and prior FDA findings in lieu of clinical trials.81 This is a less rigorous way to get 
opioids into the marketplace without the expense and time of further clinical testing 
and the critical oversight of the FDA.  
 _________________________  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, supra note 6, at 362. 
 76. Id. at 363. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 364. 
 81. NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, supra note 6, at 363. 
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B.   Off-label Use 
In accordance with 21 United States Code § 352, the FDA has the authority to 
regulate and prohibit any advertising that misleads the public and further to prohibit 
any false or misleading contents of a drug’s label.82 The Code of Federal Regulations 
prescribes the appropriate manner in which companies shall advertise and promote 
their products and sets forth the restrictions imposed on them in doing so.83 These 
guidelines are to encourage a fair and accurate representation of a drug including its 
side effects and potential risks.84  
However, after the FDA approves a new drug for use in the United States, a 
medical provider is essentially free to prescribe that medication for anything judged 
medically appropriate for the patient.85 The use of medications for purposes other 
than what they were approved by the FDA for is typically referred to as “off-label” 
use.86 This is especially true in the use of opioids.87 In fact, any medical provider is 
justified in prescribing any medications he or she feels are appropriate to treat an 
ailment or injury, even if there has been no clinical trial and the FDA has not ap-
proved it for that specific use.88 This creates another loop-hole in the system to get 
opioids into the hands of consumers without any intervention by the FDA. This out-
come seems to be counterproductive to labeling guidelines and restrictions. It almost 
certainly contradicts the intent of the FDA to force manufacturers to represent their 
medications in a fair and accurate manner if manufacturers are unaware of the pos-
sible side-effects and repercussions of consuming the medications for uses other than 
those that the drugs were tested for.  
C.  Ineffective Post-Approval Regulatory Decisions 
Despite the FDA’s attempt to use data recovered about opioid abuse in its post-
approval regulatory decisions, opioids have continued to flood the streets of the 
United States.89 As early as 2001, Purdue Pharma and the FDA teamed up to develop 
 _________________________  
 82. See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2012). 
 83. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2018). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label”, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Other/OffLabel/default.htm (last visited Nov.. 5, 2018). 
 86. Id.  
 87. NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, supra note 6, at 369. 
 88. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 85. For example, the FDA states, “If your healthcare provider is 
thinking about using an approved drug for an unapproved use, you may want to ask your healthcare provider ques-
tions like these: What is the drug approved for? Are there other drugs or therapies that are approved to treat my 
disease or medical condition? What scientific studies are available to support the use of this drug to treat my disease 
or medical condition? Is it likely that this drug will work better to treat my disease or medical condition than using 
an approved treatment? What are the potential benefits and risks of treating my disease or medical condition with 
this drug? Will my health insurance cover treatment of my disease or medical condition with this drug? Are there 
any clinical trials studying the use of this drug for my disease or medical condition that I could enroll in?” 
 89. Compare NEW SAFETY MEASURES ANNOUNCED FOR EXTENDED-RELEASE AND LONG-ACTING OPIOIDS, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm363722.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2018), with Eli Rosenberg and Nate Schweber, Three Brooklyn Clinics, 6.3 Million Oxycodone Pills 
and 13 Indictments, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/nyregion/brooklyn-clinics-
oxycodone-indictments.html. 
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a risk management plan which aimed to improve surveillance of the drugs and edu-
cate prescribers of the potential abuse risks.90 Then, in 2013, the FDA announced 
“significant” remedial measures to enhance the safe and appropriate use of opioids.91 
The FDA has been implementing post-approval remedial measures nearly every year 
since.92 Changes include, but are not limited to: labeling modifications, notifications 
of opioid misuse and abuse, and refinements to clinical studies.93 More recently, the 
FDA began taking a more aggressive approach to countering the opioid crisis by 
approving the use of Lucemyra, a drug that is supposed to mitigate withdrawal symp-
toms.94  
In the face of the efforts by the FDA to control the rampant use of opioids, the 
FDA has continued to approve new opioids for use.95 Additionally, doctors have un-
remittingly filled prescriptions for opioids, in some areas six times more prescrip-
tions per person than other countries, and opioid use remains at an all-time high.96 
State and local governments are no longer sitting idly by amidst the wake of destruc-
tion.  
IV.     THE LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A.  Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices  
The underlying claim amid the resulting law-suits against BigPharma is decep-
tion on part of the manufacturers, and their front groups, for downplaying the addic-
tive nature of the drugs and misleading prescribers of the medications.97 State and 
local governments are alleging violations of Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices 
 _________________________  
 90. NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, supra note 6, at 371. 
 91. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 85, at 371.   
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at the Public Workshop on Strategies for 
Promoting the Safe Use and Appropriate Prescribing of Prescription Opioids (Feb. 15, 2018) , 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm596893.htm ( “[A]t [the] FDA, we still have a very important role 
to play. This is especially true when it comes to helping make sure that fewer new people become addicted through 
the medical use of these drugs. We have an important role to play in supporting the development of improved med-
ication-assisted treatments for opioid dependence, which will expand treatment options for those currently addicted 
to opioids.”).We also have a role in helping support the development of new, safe and effective treatments for pain 
that don’t carry all the same risks of addiction as opioid medicines. And we have a role to play in interdicting illicit 
drugs that are pouring into our country, often through the mail.”); see also News Release, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN, FDA APPROVES THE FIRST NON-OPIOID TREATMENT FOR MANAGEMENT OF OPIOID WITHDRAWAL 
SYMPTOMS IN ADULTS (MAY16, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannounce-
ments/ucm607884.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2018). 
 95. Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and Abuse, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm338566.htm, (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2018). 
 96. Susan Blumenthal & Emily Kaplan, The Opioid Epidemic Is A National Public Health Emergency, 
HUFFINGTON. POST (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-opioid-epidemic-a-national-public-
health-emergency_us_598b0179e4b0f25bdfb320c9.  
 97. Tina Bellon, U.S. State Lawsuits Against Purdue Pharma Over Opioid Epidemic Mount, REUTERS, May 
15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigation/us-state-lawsuits-against-purdue-pharma-over-
opioid-epidemic-mount-idUSKCN1IG2WU. 
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(UDAP) statutes.98 All 50 states have UDAP statutes in place to protect consumers 
from predatory and unscrupulous business practices.99  
State UDAP statutes operate like § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
which declares it a federal crime to engage in unfair methods of competition and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.100 The difference 
among the various state UDAP statutes is the interpretation of the statute and the 
remedies available in each individual state. UDAP statutes vary immensely. Some 
state UDAP statutes may be interpreted very broadly and others are very narrow; for 
example, requiring knowledge and intent of the wrongdoing as a required element 
of the claim.101 Many states have made it nearly impossible to succeed on a UDAP 
claim by granting exemptions to entire industries, capping the maximum recovery 
amounts to as low as $1,000 in civil suits, and placing hindrances in the way of 
officials that have the authority to enforce UDAP laws.102 As difficult as it can be to 
recover under violations of UDAP statutes, state and local governments, nonetheless, 
are bringing forth these very allegations against opioid manufacturers and are getting 
the green light to proceed.103 It is reminiscent of the tobacco lawsuits of the early 
1990s.  
B. The Tobacco Lawsuits vs. The Opioid Lawsuits 
The tobacco lawsuits were initiated on the argument that the industry withheld 
pertinent information regarding the significant health risks of their products, and as 
a result, was responsible for a sweeping health crisis due to smoking-related illnesses 
and should be held accountable.104 States began to band together, much like the cur-
rent trend of cases against the opioid manufacturers, to bring claims against the to-
bacco industry to recover state funds lost treating illnesses related to tobacco prod-
ucts and to shift the burden of these expenses onto the tobacco companies that were 
reaping astronomical profits on their products.105  
The counts in the complaints against the tobacco companies alleged consumer 
fraud—a violation of UDAP statutes—for decades of findings that the industry 
downplayed the risks associated with smoking, deceptively marketed their product, 
 _________________________  
 98. See, e.g., Complaint at 42, Florida. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No.  2018-CA-001438 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed May 
15, 2018); see also Third Amended Complaint at 293–94, 312–25, City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 14-
CV-04361 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 25, 2016). 
 99. Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection In the States, A 50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts 
and Practices Statutes, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., INC. 5 (Feb. 2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/re-
port_50_states.pdf. 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012); see also Consumer Protection In the States, Appendix B, State-by-State Sum-
maries of State UDAP Statutes, NAT’L. CONSUMER L CTR, (January 10, 2009), https://www.nclc.org/im-
ages/pdf/udap/analysis-state-summaries.pdf (for examples of state by state summaries of UDAP statutes). 
 101. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 99. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Brendan Pierson, Chicago Lawsuit Over Opioid Marketing Gets Green Light, REUTERS, September 30, 
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/health-opioids-idUSL2N1C6228 ( “A lawsuit filed by the city of Chicago in 
federal court accusing five drug makers of promoting painkiller addiction through deceptive marketing can go for-
ward.”). 
 104. Karen E. Meade, Breaking through the Tobacco Industry’s Smoke Screen State Lawsuits for Reimburse-
ment of Medical Expenses, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 113, 121–24 (1996). 
 105. Id. at 124–25. 
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and even covered up research that showed causation between cigarette smoking and 
cancer.106  
Tobacco companies were widely successful battling individual consumers and 
states during the second wave of lawsuits in the late 1980s.107 The defendants’ suc-
cess was attributed to the tobacco industry’s defenses such as assumed risk and proc-
lamations that tobacco was not harmful and that other environmental exposures and 
genetics caused the cancer and the ailments tied to the allegations.108 Additionally, 
the defendants’ asserted that federal laws regarding the advertising of their product 
preempted local state laws.109 These defenses appeared bullet-proof until evidence 
began to surface that revealed that the tobacco industry was downplaying and, in 
fact, suppressing relevant risk factors about its products.110 This became the turning 
point for state and local governments to succeed.   
The third wave of suits in the late-1990s started to show signs of success for the 
plaintiffs.111 The newly discovered evidence refuted the tobacco industry’s defense 
that tobacco was not harmful to smokers, and as such, states had found their golden 
ticket.112 By late-1998, 46 state attorneys along with 4 of the tobacco industry’s larg-
est corporations settled in what became known as the “Master Settlement Agree-
ment.”113 This agreement placed restrictions on the marketing and advertising of to-
bacco products, set forth requirements that the tobacco companies pay annual sums 
of money to the states to compensate them for health care costs related to smoking, 
funded educational programs, and dissolved three of the biggest industry organiz-
ers.114  
The opioid suit allegations are strikingly similar. State and local governments 
are claiming that opioid manufacturers, their dispensers, and distributors of the opi-
oids were aware of the significant risks for abuse and misuse of the product as well 
as the high probability of addiction to the product; but they downplayed the infor-
mation, withheld the truth, and did nothing to warn of the danger.115 Another key 
similarity is that evidence has surfaced that Purdue Pharma knew of the significant 
abuse of OxyContin in the first few years after it debuted in 1996 and suppressed the 
information from the public.116  Furthermore, in 2007 top officials of Purdue Pharma 
pleaded guilty to allegations that they misstated facts about the risks associated with 
 _________________________  
 106. Id. at 125–26. 
 107. Kathleen Michon, Tobacco Litigation: History and Recent Developments, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/tobacco-litigation-history-and-development-32202.html (last visited July 
2018). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Michon, supra note 107.  
 114. Id.     
 115. Benner & Hoffman, supra note 16. 
 116. Barry Meier, Origins of an Epidemic: Purdue Pharma Knew Its Opioids Were Widely Abused, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/health/purdue-opioids-oxycontin.html. (“a copy of a 
confidential Justice Department report shows that federal prosecutors investigating the company found that Purdue 
Pharma knew about ‘significant’ abuse of OxyContin in the first years after the drug’s introduction in 1996 and 
concealed that information.”). 
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OxyContin.117 A settlement occurred only after a four-year investigation of the offi-
cials that led to a recommendation of felony charges against the company and those 
officials for conspiracy to defraud the United States.118 
As foolproof as the opioid cases appear at first glance, there is a distinct differ-
ence between the tobacco law-suits and the current wave of opioid suits. The differ-
ence is the preemptive nature of the Supremacy Clause. The FDA’s involvement in 
approving the opioids for use may have the potential to trump any state and local 
claims against the opioid industry.   
C.  The Supremacy Clause and the FDA 
The Supremacy Clause establishes that federal laws made pursuant to the Con-
stitution of the United States of America constitute the supreme law of the land.119 
Recent efforts by organizations to use federal regulatory preemption in their favor 
against state legislative intent have the potential to greatly impact the outcome of 
opioid suits.120 For instance, pharmaceutical companies are using  a federal preemp-
tion defense, or what is otherwise referred to as the “FDA Compliance Defense,” to 
counter products liability “failure to warn” allegations being brought against them.121 
The basis of the preemption defense is that since the FDA is a federal agency with 
authority to approve new drugs, keep continued surveillance on new and existing 
drugs, and force the removal of a drug from the market, organizations in compliance 
with FDA regulations should be afforded protection from state claims.122  
The FDA also has the authority to bring criminal charges or civil penalties 
against manufacturers found to be in violation of the FDA mandates.123 Pharmaceu-
tical companies are attempting to shift the burden of responsibility onto the FDA for 
its role in approving and regulating the use of drugs in the United States market-
place.124 Essentially, anything that conflicts with a federal regulation is unlawful and 
preempted by federal law; thus, in theory, compliance with federal regulations 
shields pharmaceutical companies from liability. Historically, federal preemption 
under these circumstances rarely proved successful in court because state laws that 
provide more rights to citizens than the Constitution are not a violation. However, 
Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., set the precedent for such claims to succeed.125  
In February 2004, the Dusek court found that a state requiring suicide warnings 
to be placed on Zoloft medication, contrary to the FDA’s determination that no warn-
ing was necessary, would be considered misbranding or mislabeling of a drug in 
 _________________________  
 117. Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2007) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html. 
 118. Meier, supra note 116.  
 119. See Supremacy Clause, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/supremacy_clause (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2018).  
 120. Christopher R. J. Pace, Supremacy Clause Limitations on Federal Regulatory Preemption, 11 TEX. REV. 
L. & POL. 157, 158 (2006). 
 121. Jason T. Ams, Reviving Lazarus: Status of the FDA Compliance Defense after Bates v. Dow Agrosciences 
and the New FDA Regulations, 95 KY. L.J. 765, 765 (2006). 
 122. Id. at 768. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 771. See also Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-02-3559, 2004 WL 2191804, at *9–10 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 20, 2004). 
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direct conflict with FDA mandates and, therefore, would be preempted.126 This is not 
to say that FDA compliance is a fail-proof defense. Indeed, subsequent opinions cit-
ing the Dusek case disagreed with the Dusek holding.127 Two later cases examining 
similar facts found that FDA regulation does not generally preempt state laws that 
provide stricter consumer protections.128 The courts in these cases reasoned that the 
plaintiff was not seeking a product label change that warned of an actual “causal” 
effect between suicide and Zoloft, instead, the plaintiff was seeking a label change 
that provided for a mere “association” between the two; noting that by doing so, no 
tangible conflict existed129 This proved to be a way for the court to bypass federal 
preemption by establishing differences between an actual scientifically proven side-
effect of the drug and the direct and proven association of a specific side-effect with 
the drug.  
A subsequent Texas court, hearing an allegation of misbranding against the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) in violation of the Texas State Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act, did not address the issue of federal regulatory preemption spe-
cifically; however, instructions to the lower court did allude to a bar of a preemptive 
defense.130 In that case, however, there were key differences that would prove more 
successful in barring a preemptive defense. For example, the EPA’s product-labeling 
guidelines under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 
are much less stringent than those of the FDA’s regulations for prescription drug 
labeling, and FIFRA contained an express preemption provision protecting the EPA 
from tort claims.131  
Another court, undermining the federal preemption defense, held that tort suits 
could be used as a facilitator in the progression of warning labels on products since 
there are not fixed and absolute warnings on most pharmaceutical products.132 That 
court reasoned that drug warnings will need to change as reporting comes back re-
garding the drugs’ long-term effects on broad ranges of society.133 A manufacturer’s 
accountability lies in the fact that it is in a superior position to have this first-hand 
knowledge and is better outfitted to modify its product warnings.134  
With such disparity amongst the courts, it is still unsettled as to whether or not 
the FDA’s involvement with the approval and regulation of opioids will provide a 
cloak for manufacturers to hide behind. It is, however, still very likely that when 
factoring in reformulations and off-label uses of opioids, coupled with the rampant 
widespread health crisis, courts may find that manufacturers curtailed the FDA’s 
mandates, especially when the manufacturers get the first-hand reporting and feed-
back once a drug is disbursed for consumption. Courts more often than not look to 
legislative intent,135 and although opioid manufacturers gained approval through 
 _________________________  
 126. Ams, supra note 121, at 771. 
 127. Id. at 773. 
 128. Id. at 774. See also Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 876 (E.D. Tex. 2005); Zikis v. Pfizer, Inc., 
No. 04 C 8104, 2005 WL 1126909, (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2005). 
 129. Ams, supra note 121, at 774.  
 130. Id. at 777. See also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 431 (2005). 
 131. Ams, supra note 121, at 777. 
 132. Id. at 778. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Slever, supra note 1, at 968. 
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FDA compliance, the intent of those mandates is to ensure efficacy and safety of 
products entering mainstream society in the United States.136 Allowing holes in the 
approval process to remain that are large enough for a full-blown health crisis to 
emerge is contrary to the federal legislative intent and certainly contrary to public 
policy. 
V.     REMEDIAL MEASURES 
A. SSI and SSDI Benefits 
At the forefront of necessary remedial measures is the reenactment of state-pro-
vided-benefits to treat individuals with addiction disorders. This is a disability that 
can no longer be overlooked. Addiction is not a choice. Taking away benefits from 
a disabled person based on the notion that giving an individual with disabilities ben-
efits is keeping him or her disabled is an irrational concept.137 The Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) defines the term disability to mean: (1) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more life activities of such individual; (2) 
a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.138 
Under the Act, a disability is substantially limiting if it is an impairment that is epi-
sodic or in remission [such that] it would substantially limit a major life activity 
when active.”139 Under the definition of the ADA, an addiction disability should be 
a recognized class. State-funded programs such as SSI and SSDI should support and 
assist with the living expenses, medical treatment, and reemployment of individuals 
with addiction disability. Currently the deficit of this nation treating addiction-re-
lated issues is in the billions of dollars annually. Is this the best case solution for 
individuals living with addiction disability and society as a whole? If this same 
amount of money was spent for actual treatment, housing, and medical care, the im-
pact on society would be substantial. As it stands, the billions of dollars lost each 
year are going to treat overdoses, babies born with addiction disorders, HIV infec-
tions, hepatitis C infections, and other severe medical problems resulting from opioid 
drug use, in addition to litigating and paying for criminal offenses attributed to ad-
diction issues, and recouping losses incurred by local entities.140 This figure does not 
factor in the losses suffered by family and friends of individuals with addiction dis-
orders or by the individuals with the disability themselves. Proper resources and suf-
ficient assistance to individuals with addiction disorders would have likely lessened 
the impact of the wrongdoing by opioid manufacturers and cost local governments 
far less. 
 _________________________  
 136. Ams, supra note 121, at 781. 
 137. Slever, supra note 1, at 957. (“The statutory change aimed to eliminate what Congress saw as the ‘per-
verse incentive’ of encouraging drug and alcohol abuse by providing benefits solely on the basis of addiction teach 
welfare recipients some skill or something instead of killing them on the installment plan.”).  
 138. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012). 
 139. Id. § 12102(4)(B). 
 140. See, e.g., Press Release, THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 12. 
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B.  FDA Mandates  
FDA regulations on new drug approvals for Schedule II drugs and the subse-
quent prescribing of the approved drugs need to be amended. The current standards 
for reformulations and off-label use of Schedule II drugs are not in accordance with 
public policy. Essentially, the current mandates allow Schedule II drugs to enter the 
marketplace without satisfactory clinical testing and to be prescribed for purposes 
unevaluated by the FDA.141 For example, in June 2017, the FDA requested that Endo 
Pharmaceuticals remove reformulated Opana ER (a brand name of a popular pain 
medication) from the market due to an assessment that the benefits of the opioid 
based pain medication no longer outweighed the risk.142 The original formulation of 
this drug was FDA approved for use in 2006; it was thereafter reformulated and 
marketed in 2011, but it was not until early 2017 that the independent advisory com-
mittee for the FDA convened to discuss abuse patterns and other safety concerns 
linked to its use.143 Endo Pharmaceuticals did not remove it from the market until 
July 2017.144 This computes to over a decade of distribution and consumer use in the 
United States of the original formulation and approximately six years of marketing 
and consumer use of the reformulated drug prior to the FDA’s intervention.  
Federal regulations are promulgated with the intent to protect consumers; how-
ever, very little protection is provided if the end user is taking drugs that a manufac-
turer did not have to adequately test or that a medical provider prescribes for pur-
poses other than what the FDA approved them for. In accordance with the current 
FDA regulations, consumers are in the hands of manufacturers and medical prescrib-
ers without real protection from the FDA. The FDA needs to tighten the approval 
process to include long-term clinical testing of reformulated Schedule II narcotics. 
Additionally, the FDA needs to mandate that a medical prescriber be required to get 
approval to prescribe a Schedule II drug for anything other than its intended, and 
FDA approved, use. This process should result in further scientific medical data, 
literature, and studies performed by the FDA’s independent advisory committee, or 
a designated medical team, before administration.   
Manufacturers as well as medical prescribers should be held accountable for the 
repercussions of the products they manufacture, distribute, and prescribe until 
stricter federal regulations can be implemented. Federal legislation should be enacted 
to mandate that states remove the caps on recovery for Schedule II drugs and allow 
a broader interpretation of UDAP statutes (i.e., allowing anyone wronged to be able 
to bring a claim). The disparity between the different states’ UDAP statutes is too 
great.145 Each state’s UDAP statutes should be comparable to the next in bringing 
claims for proper consumer protection. 
Legislative policies need to be implemented to limit the number and types of 
opioids, and opioid-related drugs, approved by the FDA and made available in the 
United States. Allowing more opiates to be disbursed while in the midst of an opioid 
 _________________________  
 141. NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, supra note 6, at 363. 
 142. Oxymorphone (Marketed as Opana ER) Information, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,, 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProvid-
ers/ucm562339.htm, (last updated Feb. 6, 2018). 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 99. 
17
: The Opioid Crisis
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2019
76 Barry Law Review Vol. 24 No. 1 
 
epidemic is counterproductive. If newer or reformulated versions of opioids can ev-
idence greater efficacy, then those drugs need to replace existing opioids in the 
United States, and not add to the supply.   
C.  Marketing and Incentives 
Proper marketing campaigns need to be customary and frequent to deter the use 
of opioids. The outreach of the marketing campaigns needs to be far stretched, as to 
reach all corners of economic disparities. Educational institutions need to be 
equipped with propaganda that elicits the danger of opioids as well as the prevalence 
of addiction disability. Medical facilities need to be required to place addiction dis-
ability propaganda and material concerning the dangers of opioid addiction in con-
spicuous and common areas of their practices. 
Most importantly, every prescriber of opiates should be required to provide ad-
equate medical screening for addiction disability for each patient. Federal funding 
incentives should be provided to state and local governments for monitoring, track-
ing, and recording of compliance of every medical prescriber of opioids and other 
highly addictive and misused Schedule II narcotics.  
D.  State and Local Government Pain Management Prescribing Policies 
Every state needs to be equipped with the same pain management and prescrib-
ing policies to prevent hub locations, “doctor shopping,” “pill mills,” and trafficking. 
In 2016, only 23 states and the District of Columbia had guidelines in place that 
required prescribing physicians to have continued education hours related to pre-
scribing controlled substances, pain management, or substance abuse and misuse.146 
Additionally, in 2016, only 32 states required an informed consent and agreement 
for treatment, and only 36 states required a documented treatment plan that set forth 
the actual treatment and goals to be achieved.147 According to this same study, in 
2016 only 32 states and the District of Columbia required or recommended that pre-
scribers perform a physical examination and substance use disorder assessment prior 
to prescribing a controlled substance.148 Most distressing is that in 2016 only ten 
states had regulations in place that limited the amount of pills a doctor can disperse 
in an individual prescription of opioids.149  
E.  Administration of Legal Damages Awarded 
If state and local governments do prevail in the courtroom, this could mean a 
large amount of funds being recovered by communities to help battle the opioid ep-
idemic. Suitable placement of legal damages can have a substantial impact on how 
our nation recovers from this health crisis. It is essential that the individuals with 
addiction disorders are treated first and foremost.  
 _________________________  
 146. Overview of State Pain Management and Prescribing Policies, NAT’L ALLIANCE. FOR MODEL STATE 
DRUG LAWS 5 (Jan. 2016), http://www.namsdl.org/library/74A8658B-E297-9B03-E9AE6218FA0F05B0/.  
 147. Id. at 12. 
 148. Id. at 18. 
 149. Id. at 34. 
18
Barry Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 4
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol24/iss1/4
Fall 2018 The Opioid Crisis 77 
 
Funds need to be allocated to community outreach programs, in-patient and out-
patient treatment centers, and medication assisted treatment (MAT) programs. MAT 
programs should be inclusive of state and private detention facilities to help reinte-
grate non-violent inmates, incarcerated for drug-related-offenses, back into society. 
One prominent example of a MAT program is the Vivitrol Pilot Program offered in 
Orange County, Florida, in which 4,821 heroin users were identified in the correc-
tional facility, 953 inmates were screened for interest, 92 qualified for the treatment, 
and 36 received the drug Vivitrol, which is used to counter addiction.150 With a suf-
ficient budget, this program could be expanded substantially. With adequate budgets, 
every state would have the potential to offer MAT programs in and outside of the 
criminal justice system.  
Most importantly, every prescribing physician of opioids should be required to 
participate in MAT programs to counter the possible misuse and abuse of opioids. 
Funding in the form of tax breaks for medical prescribers to offer such programs 
would prove beneficial for both the provider and the end user.  
VI.     CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the purpose of this article is to bring awareness to addiction disa-
bility and the role that the opioid epidemic has on the increasing number of individ-
uals with addiction disorders; and moreover, to bring awareness to the changes that 
need to be considered to counter the issues the United States is facing today and to 
prevail in preventing future epidemics. State and local governments alike have the 
legal system as a tool to use to combat this issue and have the potential to recover 
enormous amounts of money. With precise budgeting as well as accurate placement 
and administration of damages awarded, possibilities for change in the way individ-
uals with addiction disabilities are medically treated and the benefits they can re-
cover will be immense, as will be the remuneration it will provide to communities 
as a whole.  
 
 _________________________  
 150. Cornita A. Riley, Chief, Orange Cty. Corr. Dep’t, Vivitrol Pilot & Other Substance Abuse Programs 
Presentation (June 2, 2017), https://www.orangecountyfl.net/Portals/0/Library/Families-Health-So-
cial%20Svcs/docs/OCCD%20Presentation.pdf. 
19
: The Opioid Crisis
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2019
